from dumbphones to smartphones, and would have succeeded as Samsung did. Now we would have three successful firms producing smartphones, everything would be peachy, but the disruption would still be there, in full force.
It's not the case that failure of firms is unimportantit is. Yet it cannot be the sole determinant of a disruption. As shown later, Apple itself was radically changed as a result of the introduction of iPhone and this change is just as important as the failure of Nokia. Thus we need a new definition that depends on disruption of the behavior of consumers, and therefore of firms, that decouples the unwarranted alliance between disruption and failure of firms.
The aim of this paper is to present a framework of disruption that follows diffusion theory and in particular post-adoption behavior, define disruption and check, according to this definition, which of three major innovations of last decade, namely iPhone, Uber and Airbnb is disruptive?
The next section presents and criticizes the currently pervasive theory of disruption; the following section presents a brief literature review that has a curious gap between the substantial literature on disruption in strategy journals and almost complete lack of interest in the marketing field, as well as a definition of disruption that follows the path presented above, as in order to learn whether an innovation is disruptive, we have to find out how it changed the behavior of the major stakeholders in that industry. This will be followed by three recent examples -iPhone, Uber, and Airbnbwhere the claim is that the first two are indeed disruptive innovations, while the latter is not, at least not yet. The last section concludes the paper by offering several avenues for research that might follow this paper.
Disruption Theory, Your Roots are Showing
Christensen's disruption theory (DST) has a peculiar way of determining if an innovation is a disruption: To determine disruption one has to find out whether the innovation began its life at the low end in terms of price and quality compared to the then-available service or technology.
While we as marketing academics has all but ignored DST at the research level, we have to confront it while teaching courses such as New Products where most students find the question of whether an innovation began its life at the low end or high end irrelevant to the issue of disruption. Specifically students question the assertion of Christensen, Raynor, and McDonald (2015, pp. 4-5) that because Uber did not begin its life at the lower end of the spectrum, it is not a disruptive innovation.
There's a reason for this peculiar assertion that Uber is not a disruptive innovation, and it lies at the very root of Christensen's theory: DST began its life as a theory as to why firms fail, and as Tellis (2006) pointed out, it does provide valuable insights thereto, most notably that the most valuable and profitable consumers might not be a good source of information about a new service. This holds, as this innovative service that might disrupt the industry comes at the low end of the product/service/technology, a place where these high-end consumers have neither interest nor experience. This low-end attack, which initially does not attract much attention, might grow to be a high quality service that supplants the incumbent.
While this is certainly a valuable lesson that explains why firms might fail, consider two points: First, obviously there are other reasons why firms fail: Consider for example the recent bankruptcy of the firearms firm Remington: There was no newcomer, at either the low or high end of price or quality, that threatened its existence. Rather, it was bought in a leveraged buyout, and the level of debt proved itself too large: not an unheard of occurrence 1 . Second and more importantly, despite its name, DST is not a theory of disruption, but rather a theory on why firms fail. It was later expanded upon by Christensen et al. as an all-encompassing theory of disruption, and in the effort to defend its roots, they resort to indefensible assertions about whether an innovation is disruptive or not.
Thus according to DST, in order to find out if iPhone is disruptive, you do not have to go via the route of the Wall Street Journal that in a series of in-depth articles investigated the effects of iPhone's growth on a number of stakeholders in this industry, including suppliers, competitors, and mobile network operators. Instead, DST asks us to base our decision on whether the first iPhone offered a superior or inferior product compared to the then-available best mobile phones. The students don't buy it, and neither should we as educators and marketing researchers.
Literature Review
Christensen's disruption theory (DST) began with his best-selling book in 1997, and despite the importance of the subject, as Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) note, relatively little academic research has been done on this subject in the first decade following this book. This is partly due to the lack of appropriate measures for the disruptiveness of an innovation; and partly "…because [DST] is headlong, while critical inquiry is unhurried; partly because disrupters ridicule doubters by charging them with fogyism, as if to criticize a theory of change were identical to decrying change; and partly because, in its modern usage, innovation is the idea of progress jammed into a criticism-proof jack-in-the-box." (Leopre 2014). The last decade, on the other hand, did see some renewed academic interest in the subject.
One of the most notable criticism of DST is by a Lepore (2014) , who offered a careful takedown of the methodology used by Christensen in his original work. Some of the criticism had to do with the arbitrary definition of failure in Christensen's work that did not distinguish between disappearance of the firm due to bankruptcy, change of name, or change of ownership.
However the main point is that DST is a theory about why firms fail, and nothing more.
Christensen's response was an embarrassing personal attack on Lepore, in an interview with a Bloomberg Business reporter, followed by a partial response by a coauthor of Christensen's second book (Bennet 2014; Raynor 2014 ; see also Krugman 2014; King and Baatartogtokh 2015; Weeks 2015; and the Economist 2015) .
Quite a few of the recent papers on the subject unfortunately fell into the trap of centering disruption on firm's failure, see Schmidt and Druehl (2008) ; Marx, Gans and Hsu (2014) ; Gans (2016); As mentioned earlier this is an issue for two reasons: First, with an innovation that considerably changes the behavior of consumers, some firms prosper (Apple and Samsung) and some fail (Nokia). Concentrating just on the failing one misses the point: Disruption begins with consumers and the firms that serve them come second: some will succeed and some will fail. The disruption had already occurred regardless. Second, the heavy reliance on the initial condition, that is entry below the current offering, is odd: Somehow the theory implies that dynamic economic system of consumers and competing firms reaches an equilibrium depending on this initial condition. There are some dynamic economic systems under which the resultant equilibrium depends (or doesn't) on the initial conditions (see Muller 1984, 1986 ), yet this needs some settings and restrictions that are completely missing from the discussion. Some of the notable exceptions, where disruption does not depend only on firm's failure, are the following: Markides (2006) , and Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) offer a definition that only partially depends on the low entry point: An innovation is disruptive if it introduces a new set of features on which the firms now compete. While this is certainly an improvement on DST, this is similar to Blue Ocean Strategy Kim 2004, Kim and Mauborgne 2017 ) that refer to marketing strategy that might or might not cause a disruption. Moreover these studies do fall back to the question of initial entry below or above current offering in order to evaluate disruptions. Sood and Tellis (2011) offered a definition that does not rely on the source of attack of the newcomer, but rather simply asks if the new technology supplants the previous one by, say, reaching more than 50% market share. This definition by itself is somewhat too general, as it does not require any significant change in the behavior of any stakeholder in the industry. Thus the transition from one technology generation to the next could run smoothly without any disruption. For example, the transition from LCD to OLED display monitors in smartphones, which is part of dataset of Sood and Tellis, does not require any change of behavior on the part of the consumer: While they might enjoy their iPhone's "retina display", they most likely will not change their behavior in any significant manner based on the screen resolution, especially given that the term "retina display" used by Apple can be of either of two types of displays.
Palacios and Tellis (2014), while not specifically defining disruption, refer to a disruptive stage of a technology life cycle, as the dive, or rapid decline, in sales as a result of a growth new generation (see for example Figures 1 and 2 in this paper). The advantage of this approach is that it relates to category rather than products and thus avoids the pitfall of concentrating on the failure of a firm to define disruption.
Post Adoption and Disruption
The theory behind disruption as it relates to marketing, follows the diffusion theory and in particular post-adoption behavior 2 . Consider the media streamer Roku: Consumers buy the player, and using home network, stream TV shows and movies from various vendors such as
Netflix, buy some TV shows, and are exposed to ads. Thus an average user begins with adoption of the hardware, and shifts to post-adoption behavior in certain proportion with respect to spending. If we take the latest available data, in 2018, Roku's revenues from adoptionthat is, the sales of the hardware itselfwere $326m, while post-adoption sales, mostly of advertising, amounted to $417m. Thus for every dollar that Roku earns from adoption, it gets about $1.3 from post adoption (Roku 2018 Annual Report, p48). This is not an isolated example: The rise in technology innovation has caused a sustained shift in emphasis from adoption, that is counting units purchased, to the behavior of the consumers and consequently firms, following adoption. Thus consider everyday products such as mobile games, media streamers, and virtual assistants such as Alexa: It's not that their adoption is not important; it is, as without an initial adoption there cannot be any subsequent activities.
But the fortunes of Electronic Arts, Roku, and Amazon critically depend on subsequent activities of the consumers that determine the flow of money as well as retention: in short, their customer life-time value (CLV).
A more extreme case, where the traditional reliance on adoption differs considerably from post-adoption, is mobile apps where over 95% of them start as free (AppBrain 2019). Even in this case, though downloading the game is free, this act of download is an adoption, and is necessary for the consumer playing the game to later buy a sword or an avatar as an in-app purchase, or view a video in order to advance to the next stage of the game. Thus the player's CLV is built entirely upon post-adoption behavior. This phenomenon raises certain marketing challenges, such as lack of resources for acquisition, coupled with an alarming decline in engagement that calls for innovative marketing strategy for a sustainable business model (see for example Appel, Libai, Muller, and Shachar 2020; Haenlein, Libai, and Muller 2019) .
Thus, for example, data obtained from a mobile game developer where the decline in engagement is extremely high, implies that active users are considerably fewer than total adopters: In a typical game, within eight weeks, a total of about 2.5 million consumers adopted the game, while at the same time only about 300,000 still actively play it. Moreover, a deeper look at post-adoption behavior will ask not only if the gamer uses the innovation, but her level of usage as well. This is critical to the game's financial outcome, as the one and only revenue stream comes from post adoption in the form of advertising and in-app purchases, both correlating with usage. This difference between cumulative and active users also plays a part in Airbnb listings, as discussed later.
Somewhere in between these two extremes -Roku, a hardware with some post-adoption purchases; and casual mobile games where all action occurs post adoptionwe find many products and services: For example, fashion, where the initial adoption matters a great deal, yet post adoption, specifically when and where this item will be used/worn, is critical to the brand's success (e.g., Appel, Libai, and Muller 2018; Han, Nunes, and Drèze 2010) . Other examples include the three cases addressed in this paper: iPhone, Uber, and Airbnb: In all three cases, while initial adoption is important, post-adoption behavior is crucial to the brand's success.
This shift in emphasis from the act of adoption to subsequent behavior naturally raises the question of how substantial is this change in behavior due to the diffusion and adoption of the innovation. When the change in behavior is substantial, affects most of the consumers, and is sustained over time, firms serving this industry note this changesometimes painfully soand react accordingly. In this case, one might be tempted to call the change a disruption.
For the ten-year anniversary of iPhone, Tripp (2017) , Morris (2017) , and Dou (2017) , in a series of three in-depth articles in the Wall Street Journal investigated the effects of iPhone's growth on a number of stakeholders in this industry, including Apple itself, competitors, other related product categories, and mobile network operators. Following this path, a new definition of disruption is presented next, namely, that in order to find out if an innovation is disruptive, we have to discover how it changed the behavior of the major stakeholders in that industry. Thus disruption is defined as follows (the term "technology" refers to a service or technology or a product, or a combination thereof, and a "firm" might be a producer or a service provider depending on the product in question):
Disruption: A new technology is disruptive to a given industry if it eventually supplants the incumbent technology, and significantly changes the behavior of most of the stakeholders in this industry. The stakeholders include consumers, competing producers, service providers (or retailers), and possibly producers in related industries.
Note that the definition can be applied to product category rather than to brand level.
Though the examples shown later in this paper are on brand level, they can be applied to category: For example the AirDNA data used for Airbnb includes the main competitor (HomeAway) and thus can be applied to the category of short-term rental. One should also note that technological substitution is a slow process due to resistance to change and risk aversion on the part of the adopting consumer or firm (Stremersch, Muller, and Peres 2010) , and thus enough time should pass before we can make a judgment on the level of disruption in a given industry.
Also, in the case of a major disruption, related industries are affected as well. This will be expanded upon in the three cases in the next section, which considerably differ on this point.
iPhone, Uber, and Airbnb
This section presents three technologies that have the potential to disrupt the industries in which they operate, namely iPhone, Uber, and Airbnb. The first is the quintessential example of disruption of an industry, that early on spilled over into other, related categories; the second is a disruption in progress; while the last, it is argued, is not a disruption.
5a. iPhone
iPhone was developed by a team of about 1,000 Apple engineers and designers 3 over about three years, before being unveiled in January 2007 and going on sale in June of that year. Since then, it has sold more than 1.3 billion units in about 8 successive generations, and earned Apple more than $800 billion in revenues. Reading the Wall Street Journal series that investigated the effects of iPhone on Apple itself, competitors, other related product categories, mobile network operators, and others articles on the subject (Dou 2017; Morris 2017; Tripp 2017) , it is clear that iPhone affected these stakeholders in a significant manner. The following is a short summary of these effects:
Consumers have been changing their behavior rapidly: While in 2008, less than 150 million smartphones were sold worldwide, five years later they surpassed the sales of dumbphones and five years later, by 2018, they had reached sales of over 1.5 billion units 4 . With respect to apps, it's not so much the number of apps available (2.1m and 1.8m in Google Play and Apple Store respectively), but rather how much we download and use them. Apparently we download a lot and use a little: According to Adjust (2019) , on average, 79% of app users are lost within the first week following their download of the app. On the other hand, the few apps that we do keep and use, such as online banking or satellite navigation systems such as Google
Maps, have considerably changed our behavior. This sustained transformation has resulted in a number of changes in the firms that produce, or produced, competing products, as summarized below.
Producers: The striking change in the industry is the radical shift in the composition of firms producing mobile phones, such as Samsung, Apple, Microsoft, and Nokia. While the first two prospered, the latter two failed: Within five years of the introduction of iPhone, Samsung became the largest manufacturer of mobile phones by surpassing Nokia; and within ten years Apple has completely transformed itself as demonstrated in Table 1 . Microsoft and Nokia, on the other hand, proved once more that merging two failed ventures rarely produces a successful one. The industry has changed not only because of the demise of the slow, but also the entry of the fast -Huawei and Xiaomibetween which have more than 25% of global market share in 2019 (Statista 2019b) . The change in related industries will be discussed shortly. Service providers, aka mobile network operators, did not fare that well with the smartphone's growth. As Morris (2017) put it, the smartphone was expected to change telecom providers'
fortunes for the better. Instead, it helped make data services a commodity, and most of the growth went to Apple itself. Not only that, but as Apple earned (and kept) net cash of almost a quarter trillion USD, the network operators in the US, mainly AT&T and Verizon, amassed a similar sum, but in net debt, as they bid to buy wireless spectrum that was needed to fuel the new abilities of the smartphones.
Producers in related industries fared even worse than mobile network operators as a result of iPhone's growth 5 . Observe Figures 1 and 2 , which depict the growth of two related product categories: digital cameras, and portable satellite navigation systems. There are two main reasons why an innovation reaches such a decline in sales: The first is that it reaches its market potential, which is the entire population that is the target market for the innovation: There is simply no one left in the target market who has not yet adopted the innovation. The second reason for growth stagnation of a new product is the intrusion of a competing innovation, or a new generation of the same base technology (see Muller and Peres 2019 for a recent review paper on innovation diffusion).
Examples of the first reason for stagnation in the growth of an innovationi.e., reaching the entire market that is the target for the innovationare few and far between: Mobile phone service is certainly one example whose growth has been slowing down in the developed world in the past few years due to the natural limit of the population size 6 . Twitter might also be another example (see Wei 2018 for a fascinating argument on the stagnation in Twitter's growth). As many users subscribe to more than one mobile line, the percent of mobile subscriptions in many developed countries is larger than 100%. For example in the US, there are 120 mobile subscribers per hundred population. Another statistic is penetration, that is, the percentage of the population that has at least one mobile subscription, which currently at around 82% in the US (Statista 2019c) . Both measures remain stable in the past few years. (Figure 3 ). The fact that this growth in market share is not limited to New
York can be seen in Figure 4 , which depicts the share of ground transportation by business travelers that is reimbursed by their employers across the US. Three facts are striking about this figure: First, the speed at which Uber and other ride-hailing apps such as Lyft overtook both taxi service and car rentals. Second, the total market for ground transportation in NYC increased dramatically during this period of growth of Uber and Lyft, from 520,000 rides per month in January 2015 to about 947,000 in June of 2019. Third, this rapid technological substitution is not only happening in the personal ride-sharing business, but in the business segment as well. This is important, as it starkly contrasts with Airbnb, as will be explained shortly. Said 2018), constituting a full-blown crisis at the taxi driver level that has led to numerous foreclosures and even several suicides (Fitzsimmons 2018 ). In addition, as Figure 4 shows, this is happening in the personal as well as the business sectors, and thus the decline is fast and across the board. 28% 82% * Sources: NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission (2019); Schneider (2019) The striking difference between the percent decline in average monthly fare per cab (28%) and medallion price (82%) requires some explanation: After all, the medallion price should be correlated with future earnings of the cab bearing the medallion (discounted properly). The difference might be due to cost structure, in that if the fixed costs of running a cab are high enough, then this drop in revenues might be enough to decrease profits to such an extent so as to justify such a drop in the value of this asset. There might be two other reasons: First, medallion prices might have been artificially high at its peak, around 2014: This is partly supported by an in-depth New York Times analysis on the predatory lending that was prevalent in this industry in New York in the last decade, that might have led to inflated prices, similar to the housing bubble that led to the 2008 crash (Payabarah 2019; Rosenthal 2019) . Second, given Uber's continued losses (about $3b a year in the last three yearssee Uber S1 SEC filing), the market is not at a sustained equilibrium and fares could go up, so that Uber (and Lyft) can at least break even. The drivers who are currently selling their medallions either are not taking this into account, or more likely, do not have pockets deep enough to wait for this to happen: Indeed, about 85% of the sales of medallions in NYC in the first quarter of 2019 were from foreclosures. As one industry observer put it: "The key is liquidity" (Birch 2018) , and cab drivers just don't have it. where reimbursement for ground transportation by businesses has declined from 50% to 20%, having been overtaken by ride-hailing services. This has not yet had any effect on the financial performance of the major car rental companies in the US, which appear to be able to consistently grow revenues, profits, and vehicle utilization 7 .
Producers in related industries

5c. Airbnb
Airbnb is the quintessential Silicon Valley story of two former classmates who found an unfulfilled need in the market, launched a service out of a loft apartment in San Francisco (a garage is so 20 th century), and within five years of launch, in mid-2013, had 9 million customers 8 . Now, showing that an innovation is not a disruption is more difficult, yet the argument will be that though it caused changes in the behavior of the major stakeholders in this industry, the changes are not significant enough to be labeled a disruption: Airbnb is simply too small in comparison to its rivals (hotels and rental market), and its growth is stagnating.
Consumers have been changing their behavior and have been using the service instead of booking a room at a hotel in their destination. This change, however is relatively minor as compared with the service it replaceshotelsand its growth appears to be coming to a halt.
Note that though much of the analysis is done on New York City, the largest and an early entrant of Airbnb in the US, the pattern found here is evident in other cities across the US and Europe, as discussed later. Also note that in contrast to Uber, while Airbnb seems to have somewhat changed the behavior of the leisure/personal segment of travelers, it has had far less impact on business travel.
When analyzing a two-sided market such as Airbnb, one might wish to consider both sides of this platform: homeowners who rent their residences (or parts thereof), and consumers who stay in these homes, reflected in listings and occupancy respectively. Manhattan Brooklyn (11k). Interestingly the other three large cities in Texas -Houston, Dallas, and San Antonioare still increasing, yet by a low rate (of about 6k on average). In Europe, the one city in which Airbnb is larger than New York is London, with a similar pattern (about 80k active listings);
Paris, at around 50k, is declining since 2017, and Rome is still slightly growing at around 38k active listings (Source: AirDNA).
Note that it is possible for Airbnb revitalize its growth, as we might be witnessing a saddle phenomenon where the service appeals to the early market, yet the main market is yet to be convinced of the merit of this new service (see Goldenberg, Libai, and Muller 2002) .
In terms of the size of Airbnb vs hotels, Tables 3 and 4 summarize Airbnb's share out of total hotel bookings and revenues in 2018. While the share is impressive for such a new service, it is small: Airbnb is less than 9% of the market in monetary terms and 14% in bookings. Given the stagnation in growth, it is likely to remain small. Competing producers, aka hotels, are reducing their prices as a result of Airbnb entry and growth, the price decrease is not substantial when taking into account the control variables that should be taken into account, such as population, hotel room capacity, and airport passenger count. Thus, for example, in a study done in Texas, each additional 1% increase in the size of the Airbnb listings resulted in a 0.039% decrease in hotel room revenues (Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers 2017) . Moreover, these effects are distributed unequally between business and leisure travelers: Independent hotels and budget hotelswhich do not usually cater to business travelers are more heavily affected by Airbnb. In Texas, these effects are pronounced in Austin, where Airbnb inventory has grown extremely rapidly over the past few years, resulting in an estimated revenue impact of 8%-10% for the most vulnerable hotels in Austin. Given also the relative stagnation in Airbnb's growth in Austin, these effects have already occurred, and little further effect is expected (notwithstanding the saddle phenomenon mentioned earlier).
Several other studies, however, did not find any significant effect of Airbnb on hotel revenues, for example in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami, and other major US markets (Blal, Singal, and Templin 2018; Haywood et al. 2017) . It is possible that the significant results of Zervas et al. might be idiosyncratic to Austin due to its volatility, especially during the highdemand period of the South by Southwest Festival (SXSW) attended by 160,000 people in a city with about 40,000 hotel rooms.
This points to a characteristic of Airbnb that can be highly beneficial to consumers, namely its flexibility in supplying accommodations in high-demand periods, allowing potential hosts not to rent throughout the year, then list their properties for the peak season for the high prices they
can charge. This surge in supply weakens the effect of seasonal pricing by hotels (Li and Srinivasan 2019 York, using active listings is a sound working assumption. Also note that the more Airbnb listings are done by real estate agents, the less flexible the supply, and the benefit to consumer decreases.
Producers in related industries: Long-term rental is affected by Airbnb, though to a relatively minor degree. Airbnb is small compared to the rental market: Wachsmuth et al. (2018 Wachsmuth et al. ( , 2019 estimated that Airbnb has removed between 7,000 and 13,500 housing units from New York substitution between these two services is likely to happen (source: CoreData.NYC). Indeed Barron, Kung, and Proserpio (2018) , who assessed the impact of home-sharing on residential and rental housing prices in the US, found that a 1% increase in Airbnb (active) listings leads to a 0.018% increase in rents in the affected zip codes, pointing to a low substitution elasticity.
Moreover, given that the growth of Airbnb is slowing, its future effects on rental prices should be negligible.
Implications and Future Directions
In Second, while both have affected the respective markets that they entered, the difference lies in the sheer size of the effect: While with the advent of Uber, taxi drivers in major cities such as San Francisco and New York lost anywhere from 75% to 90% of their investment in taxi licenses ("medallions"), and many lost their livelihood as they entered insolvency (Harnett 2018 ), this has not happened in the case of Airbnb: In Texas, where Airbnb's penetration is substantial, there has been no effect on either building of new hotels or closures of hotels, and the decline in room prices has been relatively small (Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers 2017) .
Moreover in Austin, where Airbnb is substantial (the largest Airbnb market in Texas despite Austin being the fourth largest city), there's a boom in hotel being built: About 5,300 rooms under construction as of December 2018, quite a sizable addition to the current 40,000 rooms currently available in the city (Hoisington 2019) . Similarly, in New York, in 2017, there were about 270 hotels with 40,000 rooms in the supply pipeline across the city: quite a sizable pipeline to be added to the 120,000 current rooms available (NYC Department of City Planning 2017). In addition, as mentioned earlier, Airbnb's and Uber's respective market shares differ so widely that their effects on their respective markets differ by an order of magnitude.
One observation that might be made with respect to Airbnb in NYC and other major cities, is that its growth is stagnant because the city is limiting its growth by imposing further regulations. This comment, however, ignores the piracy mode of Airbnb's operation. As mentioned earlier, Airbnb as well as Uber are modern-day pirates: They enter markets in blatant violation of local ordinances hoping to be able to change these regulations down the road. This mode of operation is inherent to their business model. For example, about two thirds of Airbnb's revenues in NYC come from rental that is illegal under current city and state law (Wachsmuth et al. 2018) . Airbnb knows this full well, but refuses to cooperate with the city in order to curb these illegal activities, as doing so would erode its revenues and profits. As this is their mode of operation, it is within the usual course of business that cities and states push back. This is another point of difference between Airbnb and Uber: The regulations with respect to taxi drivers and specifically the medallion system were originally designed to protect drivers against unruly competition, rather than consumers, who were benefitting from the low costs of the service. Thus when Uber entered a city, public sentiment was in most cases favorable, and the regulations were amended so as to accommodate the new service (Hoyt and Callander 2012) .
In contrast, hotel regulation, especially with respect to zoning, is designed to balance visitors' needs against local needs, and to protect neighborhoods and communities (Cook 2010; Fontan 2019) . Local sentiment that might have been positive initially has turned against Airbnb, as these house rentals and "ghost hotels" (Wachsmuth et al. 2018 ) are blatantly ignoring zoning.
On disruption hype: Marketing has not yet succumbed to the hype and hard sell that surround disruption such as the notion of "Big-Bang Disruption" with its images of collapsing buildings and dire warnings that your business will be "destroyed overnight" (Downes and Nunes 2013) . But given the growth in the number of MBA students choosing strategy and consulting, and the trickle down of Trump-like rhetoric, perhaps we should reconsider. After all, frightening people about an eminent collapse surely gains more attention than does cool-headed discussions about confusion matrices and the advantages of adaptive conjoint.
Disruption theory has taken a wrong turn in the last decade, and marketing academics have the tools to take up the challenge of investigating the important issue of disruption as a marketing subject that is imbedded in innovation diffusion and new product growth.
